2008-04-21 - Yeah, I'm okay wit dat ...

[mindstalk]

If you approve of someone's opinion, then you hold their opinion to be correct as far as you can tell, meaning that it follows from the information available to you and the principles you hold to be correct.

Opinions don't have to be correct, they can just be preferences. Someone not liking Errant Story isn't incorrect, they just don't like it. Someone not caring about other people isn't incorrect, but they're someone I don't want near me or to have much power.

[BloodHenge]

I don't think that's necessarily accurate. If two people start with the same information and independently reach the same conclusion, it seems likely that they'd view each other as rational, regardless of the thought process that leads to the conclusion. The more often it happens, the more rational each is likely to consider the other.

If you infer the same conclusions from the same information as me, that implies that you're reasoning from the same principles as me.

Not necessarily all of the same principles, especially in the case of principles that aren't subject to empyrical proof.

[Forrest]

principles that aren't subject to empyrical proof.

No principles (of the sort I'm talking about; "first principles" as ye olde philosophers say, axioms at mathematicians say) are subject to empirical proof. Empiricism itself is such a principle. If you hold some opinion because of empirical evidence, then you don't hold that opinion "on principle", you hold it on the basis of its correspondance with something else that you hold to on principle, namely empiricism.

Philosophy is logically prior to science. If you're doing science, you're making some philosophical assumptions in order to do so (realism: that there are actual facts independent of just your beliefs; and empiricism: that these facts can be determined by observation). If you're arguing in favor of or against science as a valid (or the valid) epistemological method, then you're doing philosophy. But you can't use science to conduct that argument because then you're either undermining yourself (if you're arguing against science on scientific grounds) or begging the question (if you're arguing for science on scientific grounds).

[BloodHenge]

But my actual point was that two people working from different sets of principles can still draw the same conclusions from the same information. There are, for example, several different moral systems, but many of them consider many of the same actions to be bad, although for different reasons. Similarly, it's possible to mathmatically construct a geocentric model of the universe, although it makes astrophysics vastly more complicated.

Also, I just read your description of the hypothetical omnipathic entity... As I recall, you said earlier that one is not obligated to move the world toward a more morally acceptable state, only to avoid moving it away. However, if our moral standard is a hypothetical entity who experiences all appetites, and anything that relieves a legitimate appetite without engendering another legetimate appetite is morally desired, then why is one not obligated to satisfy the appetites of those who lack the means to satisfy their own appetites (feed the hungry, shelter the homeless, heal the sick, etc)?

[Forrest]

But my actual point was that two people working from different sets of principles can still draw the same conclusions from the same information. There are, for example, several different moral systems, but many of them consider many of the same actions to be bad, although for different reasons. Similarly, it's possible to mathmatically construct a geocentric model of the universe, although it makes astrophysics vastly more complicated.

They may draw some of the same conclusions, yes, but if two theories/models/what-have-you entail all and only the same conclusions, they are equivalent. They may be stated differently (more simply, etc) but if all and only the same things logically follow from both sets of principles, then both sets of principles entail all and only the exact same things, and are therefore equivalent.

Also, I just read your description of the hypothetical omnipathic entity... As I recall, you said earlier that one is not obligated to move the world toward a more morally acceptable state, only to avoid moving it away. However, if our moral standard is a hypothetical entity who experiences all appetites, and anything that relieves a legitimate appetite without engendering another legitimate appetite is morally desired, then why is one not obligated to satisfy the appetites of those who lack the means to satisfy their own appetites (feed the hungry, shelter the homeless, heal the sick, etc)?

Recall also my distinction between good/bad and obligatory/forbidden: hurting yourself is bad, but not forbidden; charity is good, but not obligatory; etc. The distinction is analogous to that between truth/falsity and necessity/impossibility. It is not impossible for there to be a planet orbiting 10 light-minutes from the sun, but it's false that there is.

I've not entirely worked out a way of deriving my rule for obligatoriety[*] from my standard of goodness, but the idea I'm toying with for a start is that obligations just are necessary moral truths. Doing something to someone against their will necessarily runs counter to appetites, and so is necessarily bad. That doesn't seem quite logically solid enough, but it's a start, and I'm still thinking about this issue.

[*] (which is that people have only one obligation: to refrain from acting upon any physical thing against the will of its owner, except as necessary to enforce the obligations of the owner; where all people are self-owned, and all non-person objects which are not privately owned are publicly owned by all).

[BloodHenge]

They may draw some of the same conclusions, yes, but if two theories/models/what-have-you entail all and only the same conclusions, they are equivalent. They may be stated differently (more simply, etc) but if all and only the same things logically follow from both sets of principles, then both sets of principles entail all and only the exact same things, and are therefore equivalent.

You're assuming a statistically representative sample, which isn't necessarily guaranteed.

[*] (which is that people have only one obligation: to refrain from acting upon any physical thing against the will of its owner, except as necessary to enforce the obligations of the owner; where all people are self-owned, and all non-person objects which are not privately owned are publicly owned by all).

That last bit is going to get complicated. If you're familiar with the phenomenon known as "the tragedy of the commons", you probably know where I'm going. Also note that there are varying degrees of ownership, including considerable debate over the statute of limitations on theft (especially the theft of land and personal liberty).

[Forrest]

You're assuming a statistically representative sample, which isn't necessarily guaranteed.

I don't quite follow. I was talking about the logical equivalence of differently-stated theories/models/etc. What has statistics to do with that at all?

[*] (which is that people have only one obligation: to refrain from acting upon any physical thing against the will of its owner, except as necessary to enforce the obligations of the owner; where all people are self-owned, and all non-person objects which are not privately owned are publicly owned by all).

That last bit is going to get complicated. If you're familiar with the phenomenon known as "the tragedy of the commons", you probably know where I'm going. Also note that there are varying degrees of ownership, including considerable debate over the statute of limitations on theft (especially the theft of land and personal liberty).

Actually that last bit was designed specifically to remedy the tragedy of the commons. Ownership, or rather the right of property, is not just the liberty right to make use of something but the claim right to exclude others from use. (See here for a brief description of claim rights vs liberty rights).

To phrase it another way, I'm saying that everything is property, or that nothing is "unowned", meaning everything has someone (perhaps many) who has a legitimate right to say "hey, don't do that to that!" regarding that thing. Some things, people, are their own property, and some things which are not people are owned by only one person, and that owner consequently has unlimited liberty rights regarding that thing (he is permitted to do anything to it), since nobody else has any claim rights regarding that thing (no one else can forbid him from doing anything to it).

But when more than one person owns something (be it a married couple who jointly own a house together or everybody on Earth who jointly own the air/oceans/etc together), every owner has claim rights against not only non-owners but the other owners as well. If I owned a house together with my wife (if I had a wife), she wouldn't have the liberty right to start smashing shit and destroying the house just because it's "hers", because it'd also be mine, and I'd have claim rights that said she could't do that. Likewise with typical "tragedy of the commons" issues, such as pollution: since we all own the air, we all individually (not dependent on popular vote) have a legitimate complaints against anybody polluting that air.

There is of course the question of how to balance people's liberty rights in their joint property with other people's claim rights in that same property, and my answer to that, in short, is this: a co-owner of a thing is permitted to do anything to that thing which does not deprive other co-owners of their equal enjoyment of that thing. So, if all the people of a city jointly own the sidewalks there, none of them, not even group of 99% of them, may prohibit someone from walking on those sidewalks, or place conditions on their permission to do so (such as "if you are a woman you must cover your face" or "if you are a Jew you must wear a Star of David", etc), because merely walking on the sidewalk does not impede others' equal ability to make use of the sidewalk. However, anyone in that city, even one single person, has a claim right against someone wantonly tearing up the sidewalk with a jackhammer for no good reason; even if 99% of the people in the city want to tear up the sidewalk like that. If they want to do so so bad, they can buy the dissenting 1%s share of ownership from them; provided the 1% is willing to sell for the price the 99% are offering.

I think I went over this in more detail in the "Smoking Bans" thread under Debates here, so I don't think I'll into it all over again here, unless you'd like me to of course.

[BloodHenge]

You're assuming a statistically representative sample, which isn't necessarily guaranteed.

I don't quite follow. I was talking about the logical equivalence of differently-stated theories/models/etc. What has statistics to do with that at all?

You said that if you see someone drawing the same conclusions as you, it would lead you to believe that they hold the same premises to be true and are exactly as rational as you. However, you still need a statistically significant sample size in order to draw that conclusion. Otherwise, it could be like someone claiming that 16/64 = 1/4 because you can mark out the 6s-- The conclusion is technically true, but the reasoning is fundamentally flawed.

Now, if two people always draw the same conclusions given the same information, then their systems of reasoning would apparently be logically equivalent (even if one chooses premises that the other draws as conclusions, and vice versa). However, of two people merely usually draw the same conclusions from the same information, but never view each other disagreeing, they might (reasonably) conclude that their worldviews are logically equivalent and still be wrong.

And there's also the matter of functional equivalency without logical equivalency. You view irrationality, insanity, and immorality as being equivalent, while I view them as separate things. However, you see insanity/irrationality/immorality as being divisible into different varieties of badness that correspond fairly well to my definitions of irrationality, insanity, and immorality; our largest disagreement appears to be semantics, as we seem to agree for the most part on what things are "good" or "bad". Close enough, but not necessarily identical.

[*] (which is that people have only one obligation: to refrain from acting upon any physical thing against the will of its owner, except as necessary to enforce the obligations of the owner; where all people are self-owned, and all non-person objects which are not privately owned are publicly owned by all).

That last bit is going to get complicated. If you're familiar with the phenomenon known as "the tragedy of the commons", you probably know where I'm going. Also note that there are varying degrees of ownership, including considerable debate over the statute of limitations on theft (especially the theft of land and personal liberty).

Actually that last bit was designed specifically to remedy the tragedy of the commons. Ownership, or rather the right of property, is not just the liberty right to make use of something but the claim right to exclude others from use. (See here for a brief description of claim rights vs liberty rights).

To phrase it another way, I'm saying that everything is property, or that nothing is "unowned", meaning everything has someone (perhaps many) who has a legitimate right to say "hey, don't do that to that!" regarding that thing. Some things, people, are their own property, and some things which are not people are owned by only one person, and that owner consequently has unlimited liberty rights regarding that thing (he is permitted to do anything to it), since nobody else has any claim rights regarding that thing (no one else can forbid him from doing anything to it).

But when more than one person owns something (be it a married couple who jointly own a house together or everybody on Earth who jointly own the air/oceans/etc together), every owner has claim rights against not only non-owners but the other owners as well. If I owned a house together with my wife (if I had a wife), she wouldn't have the liberty right to start smashing shit and destroying the house just because it's "hers", because it'd also be mine, and I'd have claim rights that said she could't do that. Likewise with typical "tragedy of the commons" issues, such as pollution: since we all own the air, we all individually (not dependent on popular vote) have a legitimate complaints against anybody polluting that air.

There is of course the question of how to balance people's liberty rights in their joint property with other people's claim rights in that same property, and my answer to that, in short, is this: a co-owner of a thing is permitted to do anything to that thing which does not deprive other co-owners of their equal enjoyment of that thing. So, if all the people of a city jointly own the sidewalks there, none of them, not even group of 99% of them, may prohibit someone from walking on those sidewalks, or place conditions on their permission to do so (such as "if you are a woman you must cover your face" or "if you are a Jew you must wear a Star of David", etc), because merely walking on the sidewalk does not impede others' equal ability to make use of the sidewalk. However, anyone in that city, even one single person, has a claim right against someone wantonly tearing up the sidewalk with a jackhammer for no good reason; even if 99% of the people in the city want to tear up the sidewalk like that. If they want to do so so bad, they can buy the dissenting 1%s share of ownership from them; provided the 1% is willing to sell for the price the 99% are offering.

I think I went over this in more detail in the "Smoking Bans" thread under Debates here, so I don't think I'll into it all over again here, unless you'd like me to of course.

Actually, that makes sense.

The specific "commons" issue I'm most familiar with is pelagic fisheries. To sum up (since a detailed explanation would take way too long), without regulation, market forces result in overfishing. However, as you reason, every person on the planet has a claim right to prevent overfishing (which could, ironically, increase the yield while decreasing the effort expended). Since the principle (in theory) works just as well whether you're dealing with property shared between two people or among the entire planetary population, I'm prepared to say that it's valid.

[pillar_of_hate]

I don't agree that systems of morals use different starting points and different reasoning to reach the same conclusions; if anything, they all use common maxims as a starting point, and try to build a philosophical justification for them, usually based on whatever metaphysics they happen to adhere to.

Thus, we all agree murder is wrong. Kant says it's wrong because the act of murder cannot be universalized and still retain its benefit; Levinas says it's wrong because the killing the Other destroys the primary fact of existence; Locke says murder is wrong because it deprives someone of his natural property, himself; Bentham says murder is wrong because creates less happiness for people. That's sort of the crux of Godwin's Law: we all intuit that the Holocaust was a bad thing, so any philosophical or ethical system that would allow or endorse anything like that happening must be invalid.

[BloodHenge]

I don't agree that systems of morals use different starting points and different reasoning to reach the same conclusions; if anything, they all use common maxims as a starting point, and try to build a philosophical justification for them, usually based on whatever metaphysics they happen to adhere to.

The thing is, that's not how a logical argument is made. What you've described is starting with a conclusion, and then choosing premises from which the conclusion can be deduced. If that is then set forth as a logical argument, it must begin with the premises and end with the conclusion. Each of the philosiphical views you mentioned does indeed use different starting points and different reasoning to reach the same conclusion.